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ABSTRACT 
Cirii 11rc eroi~orri:~  theot?  oJclefil1erioi~  he recorzciled it.itlr 101% petroleiin~  pi-ices:) Tlris PLI~CI. 
itses ir  rei3isioi~  of rhe tileot?,  il'llich rejlecrs denriindjici~ctions  rlzaf rise itr  resporlse to irlcreasing 
it.oritipoprrlc~iion  rirrd  incoi?lc. Tl~e  n1agrriiun'e ofproilzrcers' (zilci corrsrrn1ers'sl(lj?1~~~  is estimarecl 
irriilc~i-  hoilr  con;petitive cirrd  nionopoiisric nssut71jxioirs;  the resrtlr iildicrites a pr-esenr vulite 
coii~p~ruhle  iff  or irr  e.~cess  qf roriii>.'s Gross Cl'orld  Economic Prodref. 
Gilttie rlleoi~  srrggesrs irjiamework whicil e.~pluins  tire inieriicrioiz behveeii oil pricing airti 
riii/i;~it?~polic~,  otri! rile ecoriornic ir~cenrives  tvlzich reszrit iri  ci geireruipunerrz ofrecerir irrurket 
equiiihritriir crtide oil prices ofreiij7uczuating ~iilliiz  a $13-S2Oper hurrei range.  Tile aiia1)~sis 
coriclirties tlrcir  :lie ecorronlic iircei~iii,es  jbrpoliticul  irzstubiiii? ill ihe Persian Giiij'it.i/l  inrrecise, at~ti 
i~~oi-c~Jorr~z;ii  rr~ethotis  oJsenirrg :he ir~rertrirrioriulfvar,ieivorkfoi-  Peisicltr  G~tifoil  inn?  be e.rpecied. 
I.  ECONOMIC THEORY AND DEPLETION 
The theory of depletion is generally excluded from applied analyses of petroleum 
geopolitics.  Generally, the theory is perceived as being counter-factual in several important ways.  - 
As usually discussed, the theory assumes constant price or constant demand functions, and projects 
monotonically declining output and rising prices.  These predictions for price and quantity arise 
from both monopolistic and competitive versions of the theory. 
However, the theor3; can be extended to reflect upwardly shifiing demand functions rising in 
response to growing income and population?  and constant, increasing, or declining extraction cost. 
With these two extensions, depletion theory projects market equilibria where output rises. peaks. and then declines.  The price trajectory may decline. stay constant, or rise with the latter part of the 
path always increasing.  With these modifications, the theory can be used to calculate the 
magnitudes of producer and consumer surplus \vhich may arise from future use of world oil 
resources. 
First, consider Equation (1). It separates the competitive equilibriuin trajectory for 
production and use into two components: 
Were, t is 1he rime subscript, QE is the market equilibrium quantity of production and consumptioii. 
QC is the quantity which wouid h3i.e been demanded in a competiti\:e market bvithout resource 
lii~litations.  r is the real discount rate. and SF is a scarcity factor reflectins the amount by which 
unconsrrained production exceeds remaining stock (see Appendix for details). 
The associated price path is in Equatioii (7).  MC is marginal cost, P is price, SF is the 
scarcity factor again. and B 1 is a coefficient. 
Equations (1) and (2) simplify the results of an optimal control solution to the problem of 
finding maximum producer and consumer surplus in competitive and monopolistic markets where 
demand curves shift upward as population and incomes rise, and remaining petroleum stock is 
finite.  in addition, the marginal extraction cost may change over time in response to technological 
resources.  or environmen~ai  conditions, but remains unaffected by the declining stock of remainin, 
The full problem and solution is summarized in the ~~~endix',  showing the basis for these 
Equations. Note that in Equation (I)  the equilibrium quantity QE would equal the market solution QC if 
there were no resource limitatioii. making the scarcity factor SF equal zero.  Similarly, in Equation 
(2).  price equals marginal cost ifthere is no scarcity. Furthermore, if in the presence of scarcity. the 
.  .  marginal cost of estraction Lvere declin~ng  over time. the optimai price trajectory may initially 
decline before ultimately rising. 
Figures 1 and 2 show stages of the solution.  Figure l represents market equilibria with 
shifting demand arid supply functions. and no resource limitation.  This trajectory is also s!lo\\n  in 
Figure 2. as the sequence of triangles.  Ho\vever. with an effective resource constraint. the loiver 
cune  shows actual equilibria reflecting scarcity.  Note tl-iat; even with scarcity, consumption 
increases for many years. 
11.  PERSIAN GULF COSTS AND PRODUCERS' SURPLUS 
In estimating crude oil production costs, petroleum economics has deveioped its o\vn 
applied version of discounting.  in a simple form.  it is: 
Adjusted  Total  interest  +  risk  -  deption) 
(3)  Investment  =  Initial  *  ( rare  factor 
in Development  Investment 
Using Adeinlari's work, the development cost in the Persian Gutf is 55 cents per barrel 
(Chapman, 1999 and Adelman, 1993). This follows from assumptions of 52.50 per barrel initial 
investment for explorationt testing, and production equipment, and 10°h,  10%, and 2% for the three 
rates.  The result (55e) is used in Equation (4): Illustrati~e  In\ estment 
Crude Oil  =  in  -  Operations,  -  Shipping 
Cost for  De\ elopment  Lifting 
Saudi Arabia 
Although this outline of costilig tvill seem simplistic to petroleum engineers: it captures the 
essence of the method  Generall!.  the same cost v~ould  be expected to produce and delrber Saudi 
crude oil to Europe, Japan. or the U S 
The comparable figure for the North Sea or Alaskan oil fields is on the order of S15 per 
barrel.'  This is because geography and climate impose higher technological requirements with 
higher costs.  If \ye consider geographic and cost data together. it appears that oil production has 
increased in the resions with higher cost and lower reserves.  Simultaneously, production has fallen 
in the Persian Gulf Lvhere reserves are high and costs are low 
Persian Gulf oil is not merely the lou.est cost region.  It is the region with the greatest 
remaining reserves, as showtn in Table 1.  Note the limited resources in the United States and in the 
North Sea. At some future period, as 4iaska and the North Sea begin to decline. OPEC producers 
may be able to re-establish the price and quantity canel that existed briefly in earlier periods. 
Through the application of Equations (1 ) and (2). illustrative estimates of the magnitude of 
producers  and consumers  surplus can be made (see the Appendix)  These are shoun in Table 2 
The first column defines each of the 5 cases  The second column shou~s  the optimal years of use of 
crude oil into the future for each case.  The third column (lambda) is the shadow price, the value in 
the present of adding an additional barrel to world resources. 
The last two columns are the most important.  hTV  is the net present value of producers' 
surplus.  It is economic rent, the profit above cost, where cost includes a return to investment and to isk  as described above.  SW is the present value of social welfare. the sum of producers' and 
consumers' surplus.  Consumers' surplus (not shown separately) is the difference beh:een the fourth 
and the fifth colum~is.  [Social welfare, the sun:  of producers' and consumers' surplus. is calciiiated 
with .Appendix Equation (A1  j.  Producers' surplus is caiculated with Equation (A?).  Consumers' 
surplus is the difference between SLV  and NPV.  For monopoly cases, the superscript is "m"  rather 
tlian "c."  and the Equation (A10) for monopoly quantity is used in Equations (Al)  and ('421.1 
Social welfare and consumers' surplus are both maximized by the competitive case. Set 
present value:economic  rent is maximized by the monopoly case.  Case 3 assumes a competitive 
market exists for 30  years, until world use peaks.  Then. in the 31st year, nioriopoly replaces 
con:;ie:itio:1. 
The 4th and 5th cases in the Table are "backstop"  cases.  They assume that new fuel 
feedstock such as biot~iass  or coal-based liquids can become widely available at an equivalent cost 
of S50  per barrel.  (This implies S2 per gallon gasoline: 50.80 per gallon for refining and 
distribution, and S1.20 per gallon for the 550 per barrel crude feedstock.  There are 42 gallons per 
barrel.) 
Since Persian GuITcosts are so much lower than in other producing regions, much of the 
eco~~omic  rent in the 4th column goes to those producers.  Note that the difference between 
competition and monopoly (cases #1 and $2) is 56 trillion as a present value.  Converted to future 
value at 5"0 interest at the end of production 192 yearsj, that value would be S534 trillion. 
Regardless of the time perspective. there is considerable economic motivation to control Persian 
Gulf oil production. 111.  IS .4  CAME THEORY EQUILIBRICM STABLE? 
In the early period of the Persian Gulf oil crisis. then-president Bush and Secretary of State 
James Baker were very explicit about the economic   no ti vat ions for reversing the Iraqi attempt to 
dominate the Persian Guii. Table  1 indicates that Iraq sought control over 55 percent of proved 
reserves.  This quotation was typical: "Our jobs, our way of life. our own freedom and the freedom 
of friendly countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world's greatest reserves fell 
into the hands of Saddam Hussein." (New York Times. 1990 and Yergin.  1991, p. 773) 
Iraq was deieated (as it had been in Iran), and its \\orid  production in the 1990s is reduced to 
only ZO?b  of its 1989 level.  Nevertheless. there are importailt unresolt-ed issues ihat need to be 
addressed. They include: 
the political motivation oil the part of lo\v cost Persian Gulf producers to offer a price shelter for 
expensive Xonhem Hemisphere oil: 
the po~verful  economic incentive for continuing instability; 
the military cost to the C.S. of guaranteeing access to lo\s cost Persian Guif oil; and 
the existence or pstential for international mechanisms to address the incentives for seizure and 
the global problems ofgrowing energy use. 
If Persian Gulf production costs are as low as the data suggest, why do the Persian Guif 
producers not seek monopoly power by first driving high cost conlpetitors out of the industry? 
Adelman's work leads him to conclude that 55 per barrel could have been an equilibrium 
competitive price in the 1980s and 1990s (Adelman 1986 and 1993. p. 25. Also see The Ecorzon~isr, 
1999, pp. 23-25. which also notes SS as a possible purely competitive equiiibrium price.).  He had 
noted that this price would have been profitable for OPECl and could have led to major increases in 
OPEC production and world oil consumption.  At the same time, a price of SIO or below would reduce capacity in the U.S, and in the Sonh Sea. 
It is this latter point which should be given considerable attention.  If Saudi .Arabia and 
Persian Gulf governments keep prices in :lie  Sl5 to $20 range, they support high cost oil production 
ii? the cotintries \shich provide militac security for Persian Gulf governments. 
This important point is emphasized by George Bush's meetings with Saudi government 
ministers and the King in  1986. Bush. then Vice President: publicly and privately sought Persian 
Gulf support for higher crude oil prices.  The price at that time was below $10 (Yergin, 1991. pp. 
755-761. Yersin's commentary notes one OPEC oil minister discussing S5 as a possible market 
-  -  price: p.  39.). 
The economic losic is as follo\vs.  U.S. net imports of petroleunl ha\e reached one haifof 
total use.'  The U.S. production is cosril: production cost in the Persian Gulf is not.  Consequently, 
lo\\*  cmde oil prices increase U.S. dependence on imports in t\vo ways.  High cost U.S. production 
has ro be shut down when crude prices are near or belo\l- SIO on a long term basis.  Second. C.S. 
consumption of oil increases with lower pfices.  The end result is that crude prices in the Sl5 to S20 
range avoid financial loss for American oil producers, slow the decline in V.S. production levels. 
and encourage U.S. political suppofl for Persian Gulf governments threatened by Iraq or other 
forces seeking monopoly power over Persian Gulf oil. 
The result of those 1986 discussions was an agreement to set S  15 to S  18 as a world goal 
(Yergin, 1991, pp. 755-76: ).  As already noted, that price ie\rel  has endured.  The Persian Gulf War 
added strength to the existing relationships. 
Car~sidrr  iapan's position in supporting the militan; defense of Kuwait by the US.-led 
operation,  Japan imports essentially a!l  of its petroleum.  Three-fourths of its crude oil has 
originated in the Persian Gulf region (ESEIX: 1992: p. 52,). In the short run, it would benefit from a S5 to S10 world price. Butt if Persian Gulf oil drives out U.S. and North Sea producers, the 
resulting monopoly-influenced price would exceed the current Sl5  to $20 range.  With a long nin 
perspec1ii.e. Japan can depend upon stable prices and political stability for its supply, both 
supported by the C.S.(Yergin, 1991. pp. 759-760). 
Table 3 lays out these and related points in a ganie theory framework. Both Persian Gulf 
and OECD govemnlents have been accusto~ned  to the Sl5  to $20 stable price range.  Either group, 
actins alone, could for a short period force prices in either direction from this range.  However. at 
least for the near tern] into the nest century: both groups have incentives to keep prices in their 
T'  '  '  current ranze. .  RIS IS similar to the ganie theory concept of ~Vush  Ec~trilihrium:  a status quo where 
neither side can improve its overall situation by changing its strategy.  A game theory approach. 
tlie:~.  is intended to represent the interaction iicpoiirics, military defense, and economics in tvorld oil 
markets. 
This $15 to $20 level is far below a true monopoly price.  It  is also far above a truly 
competitive ~vorld  price.  The outcome in one narrow facet resembles a competitive market: world 
price is about at the levei where It equals the marginal cost of high cost producers. 
In 1998, cash prices for Persian Gulf oil were in the S10 to $15 range.  The primary cause 
may have been a cessation of accelerated gro\vth in petroieum consumption in ilsia. Throughout 
most of that year, futures prices remained in the $15 to $20 range.  With this downward pressure of 
the 1998 cash prices, the 1999 response could be anticipated which would return these crude prices 
to the usual range. 
The second problem affecting the ievel and stability of prices and supply has already been 
noted: the Persian Gulfs holdings of extensive amounts of lotv cost reserves constitute an incentive 
for continuing political instability.  The magnitude of potential gain is evident from the analysis. LVith  a competitive world market, the economic rent accruing to the owners of the resource had a 
1996 present value on the order of fifteen to hventy trillion dollars (see Table 2 again). 
Ifa  monopoly were unexpectedly to reassert control, the economic rent estimate \vould be 
higher. in  :lie twenty to twenty five trillion dollars range.  This petroleum rent, or profit abo\.e cost. 
is comparable in magnitude to the planet's total Gross Economic Product. [World gross economic 
product was S30 trillion in 1997 (World Bank, 1999).] 
On a short run basis, the annual Persian Gulf production is typically in the five billion barrel 
range in the 1990s.  Recalling the discussion of Saudi Arabian crude oil costs. the rent, the 
difference between price and cost, is typically between 510 and 515 per barrel.  IVe can assert thai, 
with the current market kamework. Persian Gulf go\.ernments earn at least 550 billion annually in 
rent above cost. 
The rrernendous magnitude of these amounts continues to offer incentives for groups outside 
the current framework to gain some part of this value through arms and political coercion. 
Consequently, continuing politicai instability is a possible result of the high levels of economic rent. 
This leads to the third issue: what is the military cost to the OECD countries of protecting 
the current market framework and continued access to the extensive Persian Gulf reserves? 
Economists generally do not consider this point to be relevant for calculations of external cost.  One 
exception is the work of Darwin Wall.  Hall's statistical analysis (l9**) finds a relationship between 
oil imports and C.S.  defense spending.  Translated into simple terms, each barrel of imported oil 
adds S1O to defense expenditures. This outweighs a trend variable, which would be reducing 
military spending by Sl7  billion annually, in the hypothetical absence of oil imports.  Hall also 
concludes that the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve adds another 52 to Federal expenditures for 
each barrel of imported oil.' During the Cold War era of competition between the Soviet Union and C.S. allies, there was 
considerable concern about Soviet influence acquiring a voice in Persian Gulf decision-making. In 
1920 and again in the 1940s during World \Tar  11. the Soviet Cnion actively supported shon-lived 
soviet republics in  1r;in. in l95(!.  rhe C.S. Central Intelligence .4gency provided short-tern1 
leadership to the effort to change Iran's go\-emment.'  The collapse of the Soviet Union ended this 
competition in the early 1990s. 
It must be noted that Hall's approach is not widely accepted amongst environmental 
economists.  Outside the field of environmental economics, energy econoniists are somewhat more 
interesizd.  But even among analysts concerned with petroleum and militarypolitical security, there 
is relucta~ice  to take kidj's iiieril! dollars-and-cents approach." 
IV.  CAY THE PRICE OF OIL BE PREDICTED'? 
Economic theory suggested \-ery neat possibilities for projecting future prices for finite 
resources.  In contrast. the preceding discussion introduced the complex worid of geopolitics, which 
created a decade-long era in which crude oil prices %ere generally in the Sl5  to $20 per barrel 
range. 
'Oil shociis' which create rapid price increases are dramatic, as occurred briefly in the 1970s. 
1980s, and 1990s. However, unexpected events can also reduce petroleum prices.  One such 
surprise took place in 1998.  Even though world oil consumption continued to increase, oil prices 
dropped sharply. Figure 3 helps explain this.  [Of course, Figure 3 is not drawn to scale; it shows 
the economic logic of shifting demand and suppiy curves causing price reductions tvhile 
consumption increases.] 
First, note that actual oil consumption increases from the first period to the second period: Q:,,  is greater than Qi,.  (QI, is actual quantity in the first period, and Q2, is actual quantity 
consumed in the second period.) 
But, actual prices have fallen sharply. and PZh  is much lower than P,  in spite of the increase 
in world oil consumption. How does this happen? It Yvas  a result of surprisins shifrs in both 
demand and supply curves.  The world oil industry had expected the global demand curve to 
continiie to shift upward, to move from Dl, (actual tirst period demand curve) to DIE  (expected 
second period demand curve).  Oil production capacity was adequate, and the graph shows the same 
supply curve ior the 5rst period. SCI,4.  and the expected supply curve for the second period. SC2,. 
If everqthing had gone as expected. the expected second period price PZE  would have been about the 
same, and the expected second period market equilibrium for quantity (QJ  tvould have increased. 
Both are sho\vn. 
Wowever. there were ~~~;i?  major surprises.  First. the economic downturn in Asia in 1998 
made the actual global demand cure  D2?  much less than the expecred D2E.  Second, Iraq nearly 
doubled its sales in  1998, so more oil %as available.  The actual global supply curve SC,,  was 
greater than the expected SC,,. 
The results?  Q,,  -~ increased from the previous year's actual Q;,,  and actual price dropped 
sharply from P;, to P2,4. 
Suppose the low crude oil prices of I998 were to continue.  We know from the preceding 
analysis that there would be significant reductions in high cost U.S. oil production.  There would be 
a restructuring of the U.S. oil industry as shut-down production required new corporate networks 
organized around increased use oilow cost Persian Gulf oil. 
.Alternativelyl the strategic game theory equilibrium might return crude prices to the Zil 5 to 
S20 range, as happened in April  1999 (Sew York Times. April 10, 1999). It should not be supposed that there is sufficient information here to make a precise forecast 
of the price of oil at some future date.  We do know. however, that we have identified the factors 
which influence those future prices. 
Personally. \re expect continued low crude oil and gasoline prices (in real dollars) in the 
early beginning of the 21st Century. Very much further into the future. we might see the emergence 
of continuously gro\ring real prices for petroletlm products and ultimately the emergence of new 
energy sources to substitute for today's petroleum technologies. 
V. POLICIES: MILITARY: T;tY;ITIOS;  ADMINISTRATION 
The long period of low gasoline and oil prices in association with gro~ving  world and U.S. 
consumption seem persuasive evidence for the absence of any economic problems associated with 
the concepts of scarcity or depleticpn. However7  an application of economic theory (incorporating 
upwardly shifting demand functionsj projects a long period of rising output and stable prices, 
followed by declining output and rising prices. 
Current cost of production and transport of Persian Gulf oil to Europe. Japan. and the U.S.  is 
low, on the order of52.50 per bane:.  Comparable figures for the Xorth Sea and Alaska are on the 
order of $1 5 per barrel.  The geographic distribution of crude oil is such that current world 
production comes disproportionately from high cost, lower reserve regions. 
Economic theory related to competition and monopoly helps explain some dimensions of the 
policies of OPEC and OECD countries, but game theory helps incorporate the political factors 
which support a stable status quo in the near term.  It is one possible description of current markets: 
the term reflects the interactions of economics, politics, and military considerations. 
Given the magnitude of economic rent and geological resources in the Persian Gulf region, 
12 the incentives for the use of military force to gain or defend access will continue.  As the region's 
share of remaining petroleum resources continues to rise. the potential for armed conflict will 
increase. 
George Bush articulated a view that international military force is appropriate to defend this 
world resource against mol~opolistic  control by aggressive invaders. However, the combination of 
the growing economic importance of Persian Gulf oil and the increasing importance of petroleum as 
a source of greenhouse gases will define a new challenge.  At some future period, international 
taxaiion as well as military protection may be considered for application to Persian Gulf oil. 
One form of international administration already exists. the status quo.  CK-authorized 
military forces were still i11 place in  1999. For Iraq, the Security Council continues to limit oil 
production and foreign trade,  As a consequence of the war, U.S. military forces remain significanf 
in  several countries. and bombed Iraqi oil facilities in early 1999. Naval power in the Gulf 
conrinues as well.  In the short run, this de facto intemational administration will continue. 
A second type of international administration is the management of production and pricing 
goals by OPEC.  OPEC itself is evolving into a broader organization with the inclusion of Mexico.  - 
Russia, and Nonvay into the production quota process. [Wull  Sweet Jour~zul,  June 26, 1998. The 
Saudi oil minister reaffirmed the price range goals outlined here, and argues for a broader global 
organization to handle production planning.] This emerging producer organization may play a role 
in international policy. 
Taxation, particularly, may become relevant.  The basis may be Persian Gulf exports. or 
international trade in crude, or world crude production.  Consider for illustrarion a $5 per barrel taw. 
For Gulf producers with about SlZ.50 per barrel in economic rent above cost. the tau would transfer 
40%.  The revenue could be used to finance IJN-authorized peacekeeping activities, or climate 
- " 
-2 change programs.  The consumer impact would be an increase in gasoline prices of 12 cents per 
gallon. 
\,'ariations  in the concept wouid include (a) initiating a very low tax, increasing it gradually. 
and (b)  dividi:iy iar rei.eilue into shares for exporting governments. and intematioi~ai  use. 
Looking into the future, several points are clear. 
In the next decade. North Sea and Alaskai~  production will peak and decline; 
-. 
i lie Persian Gulf xvill  increase its share of remaining resources: 
Prices and rents tvill begin to increase sometime in the first quarter ofthe 2lst Century: 
Thc economic incentil-e  will increase for military seizures of Gulf oil regions by Iraqi-type 
military actions; 
Nuclear and n~issile  \yeapons testing 1.vili  continue: both by one or more Gulf nations and their 
neiglibors: 
Global production and consumption will continue to rise in the near future before peaking; and 
The Kyoto Protocoi and future climate change treaties will develop economic incentives to 
influence levels of world oil consun~ption. 
Supporters of Morris Adelman's perspective will be comfortable with the emphasis here on 
low Persian Gulf production costs and the global importance of oil from that region.  (They may be 
less comfortable with the reconciliation of depletion theory with the current era of low prices and 
growing consumption.)  Nevertheless. we share this Adelman conclusion, "Trillions of petrodollars 
have changed the Middle East from a local hot spot to a world problem ,...The cycle will continue: 
meetings. quotas. firm prices, cheating. price declines. threats and promises, meetings, with here 
and there some drastic politicai-military moves.'' (Adelman, 1993; p. 29) 
International administration does exist today in a de facto form, wirh respect to U.N. and U.S. military control. and OPEC output;price planning.  The confluence of trends points iowards 
continued concerns about stability, prices, and climate change.  Perhaps the major issue raised here 
is the future evolution of current aspects of internariona! management of crude oil in the Persian 
Gulf APPESDIX: A MODEL OF OPTIMAL RESOURCE DEPLETION FOR COMPETITIVE 
AND MONOPOLISTIC XIARKETS 
This Appendix provides a summary of the model framework from which Equations (1  and 
(2)  in the text are derived.  These two equations are compact expressions of Equations (A')  and 
(A9) below.  The values in Table 2 are calculated with the Appendix equations.  The model's 
utilization of dynamic demand and cost functions with explicit solutions can be seen as an extension 
of the Hotelling (193 1) model of exhaustible resources.  The parametric assumptions employed in 
obtaining the results in Table 2 are shown in Table 4. 
Consider a perfectly competitive world oil market with a fixed stock. S. of remaining oil 
resources.  Let PI  be ~nc.  tvitrid oil price (per barrel) arid C,  be the marginal cost of oil extraction in 
period I, respectively.  Suppose population. x, and per capita income. y,, are both increasing 
steadily over time.  This tvould imply that the (inverse) demand function would be shifting outward 
over time.  For con~putational  ease, we make the follo\ving two assumptions: (i) The inverse 
demand function is linearly related to world oil production, q,;  and (ii) as a first approximation, the 
marginal cost of extraction changes over time in response to technological innovation and 
environmental protection. 
The world oil market may be represented as maximizine the present value of social welfare 
(SW), the sum of producers' and consumers'  surplus, subject to the appropriate economic. 
demographic, technological, and geological constraints. Under our assumptions, this may be 
characterized as follows: where 
and 
,f? < 0  is the slope of the inverse demand function with respect to quantity; 
,O:*  > 0 defines the intercept ofthe inverse demand function; 
6  > O  is the elasticity of the inverse demand function intercept with respect to world 
population; it represents the responsiveness of oil price and quantity to iVr; 
v, > 0 is the elasticity of the inverse demand function intercept with respect to per capita 
income; it represents the responsiveness of oil price and quantity to ,v,; 
4 > 0 is the population growth rate; 
8.  > O  is the growth rate of per capita income; 
q5  S-  z 0 is the growth rate of the marginal cost of extraction; 
r > 0 is the discount rate; 
S > O  represents remaining oil resources. 
Since under our assumption of perfect competition, social welfare maximization is 
equivalent to the maximization of the present value ofprofit (Chapman 1993), we may restate the 
- - 
i: problem as follows: 
s.r.  A',  = q,' 
'YO = 0 
,  <  S 
Note in this non-stochastic optimal controi problem, there are two control variables: q;', the quantity 
of oil produced at time t.  and T,  the terminal period of the planning horizon.  (The superscript c 
denotes the optimal solution in a competitive marker.)  The state variable is cumulative production 
through period t, X.'.  The Hamiltonian. F.  associated with the competitive oil market case is 
If'  =  jj0.e"  - ~~4~)  - c,e']q,  - 44,  .  >  --  24  =  0 
e " 
where A, 2 0 is the costate variable.  The first order conditions for the optimal solution are: pH'(*) 
(11)  2, =  -  = 0  (i.e.. i, isconstantj  El' 
a  (*) 
(iii) X, =  -  -. 
CA  - sf 
Solving the first order conditions gives us the following: 
%'hen  the constraint implied by the finite rernainiilg stock of oil resources is non-binding. 
XT  ;  S and jL = 0. In this situation. throughout the period. 
I.e., the optimal production trajectory would be identical to that produced by a competitive oil 
market without any resource limitations.  However; when the constraint is binding,  >O  and 
Iq,dt = S  Under these conditions we obtnrn 
0 
PI  2'  = -  (P;  - S)  ; and  MY) 
T 
uhers pi  =  [QC  dr  , i e .  the cumulatiie production through 7'  that would ha~e  occurred in a 
1 T' 
perfectl? conipetitire market in the absence of a resource constraint, and .bf(r) =  jrr'&  is an 
0 
accun:ulation  factor.  Sote that (K  - S) represents the amount by which unconstrained production 
excecds the remaining stock and thus represents scarcity.  Therefore, the optimal oil producrio~ 
trajectory may be written as: 
ui  a,  = QC, - enSF  (‘48) 
?  - s 
where SF  =.  Is a scarcity factor.  The corresponding optimal price trajectory is: 
A4(rJ 
Follct~~ing  the logic of the ahme uptirnizarjon. it can be shown that the solution to the optimal 
depletion problem in the case of an oil market characterized as a pure monopoly is: 
The optimal value for T, 7".  may be obtained by substituting the expression for the optimal 
mw 
oil production trajectory in Equation (Ai)  and solving the condition -  = 0  . This results in 
cT 
7;  : q,:  = 0  if the resource constraint is binding 
T" =  min  ,-  (A1  I) 
C,eQ':  if the resource constraint is non - binding 
Kote, in the text, QEit) refers to q,'  and Piti refers to P;'.  For the numerical values shown in Table 2 
ofibe text, the parameter values in Table 4 were assumed. 
It  is worth noting that Stiglitz (1976) showed that in the presence of constant elasticity 
demand functions and zero extraction costs: the competitive and monopoly cases yield identical 
2 Q price trajectories.  Hoxvever. if either one. or both, of these conditions are not met. the monopoly 
price is initially higher and the optimal production horizon is longer. Furthermore, Stigiitz argued 
that these two price paths diverge only slightly.  This result was reexamined by Pindyck (19.8)  who 
showed that deyree to which a monopolist is able to exercise his monopoly polver depends on !;is 
ability to take advantage of the short term adjustment lags in the demand for output. This tvas 
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session on conflict and resource scarcity organized by Jane Hall.  The authors would like to 
acknokviedge the editorial supporl of Susan Weitz.  Constructive and interesting questions were 
raised by two anonymous referees. 
I.  This paper is in part the basis for Chapter 9, "L$-orld Oil: A Stratesic Limited Resource?" in 
Chapman i  1999j.  Also see Chapman (1983). This second article was the basis for the Appendix. 
which describes the optimal controt fiarnework for Equations (1) and (2). Further discussion of the 
results is available in Rowse (1988 and 1990). 
7  -.  Again as illustration, use Adelman's (1993) L'K va!tie  of SlJ,400 per daily capacity. SOW 
assume this includes exploration cost.  For the 'oil discount factor,' use 10 percent interest, 10 
percent risk factor, and 5 percent decline.  Assume $5 per barrel each for operations and delivery to 
a European port refinery.  The result is 515 per barrel production cost for crude oil for the UK. 
3.  There is some disagreement on the point as to whether import dependency should be 
measured by imports alone, or net imports defined as imports less exports.  On the net import basis, 
the U.S. percentage is about 50 percent ofthe 6-7 billion barrels of annual consumption.  Both U.S. 
annual consumption and the net import percentage are slowly increasing.  The Persian Gulf has 
suppiied about 20 percent of imports over a quarter of a century. 
4.  The Strategic Perroleurn Reserve is maintained at nearly 600 million barrels.  Hall's estimates were in  I985 dollars (Hall, 1992); the text values are in 1995 dollars.  An analysis by 
Green and Leihy implies military cost at about $5 per imported barrel (see Kahn, 1998, p. 2381. 
Llichael O'Hanlon at the Brookings Institute estimates a very high Persian Gulf military cost for the 
United Stares: S50 biilion annually.  See .l,.e11,  Yo14  Tinzes. December 30. 1995, and Septen~ber  IS. 
1996. 
i  -.  Kermit Roosevelt coordinated this effort.  Roosevelt (19'9)  is very informative.  A brief 
economic history of the Cold War in oil is in Chapman 1983, pp. 83-86. 
6.  Some other so~jrces  on the econon~ics  of petroleum and national security are -3idelman 
(1993. pp. 27-28), Boki and Quandt (1984). Broadman and Hogan (1988):  Lichtenbla~l(1994,  pp. 
329-346'). Lovins and Romm (1992:93), Ravenal (1984 and 1985). Shibley Telhami and Michael 
O'Hanlon attribute $50 billion annually to L.S. military spending related to the Persian Gulf (see 
,Ve:i  lbrk I'iines, December 30, 1995, and September IS. 1996). 
7  ,  .  Neu. technologies may bring such sources as tar sands, oil shale, and coal liqiiefactjon into 
commercial gasoline production.  Much higher prices would bring these sources into production. 










Former Soviet Union 
Gross national product 
Not applicable 
Net present value 
Organizatioi:  for Economic Cooperation and Development 




JEL Classification Code TABLE 1 
Geologists' Upper Probabilit) Estimates of Regional and World Crude Oil 
(billion barrels) 










Former So\ irt Union  I 
233  1  291 
660 
Note:  On identified reserves: Iraq 100; Iran 89; Kuwait and Neutral Zone 99; Saudi Arabia 259. 
Worid totals include other regions.  Total four countries: 547; or 55 percent.  See U.S. Geological 
Survey and other sources distiissed in Ckqrnan  4 1993 and 1999). For 1995 production, the 
amounts were: Persian Gulf 7; FSU 2.5; U.S. 2.5; Nortl-i Sea-Western Europe 2; world total 22: all 
in billion barrels.  Also see Campbell and Laherrere (1998, pp. 78-83). 
215 
United States 
horth Sea - Western 
--  7: 
17 
5  5 
33 
Europe  t 
7F 
5 l 
938  IVorld  1.938  1,000 TABLE 2 
Producers' Surplus and Social \%'elfare:  Present Values 
T  h"  NPV"  s  \vc 
CASE  (\-ears)  (Slbl)  (in billion S\  (in billion S) 
1.  Competition  69.14  S7.16  Sl5.659  $3  I ,561 
2.  Monopoly  91.75  SJ02  52 1,469  52-,980 
3.  Sliift from competition  80.50  na  516,153  $3  1  :221 
to monopoly, year 1  I 
4.  Competition  47.67  52.63  S5,5 19  S29,365 
bvith backstop 
5  blonopoly with  55.20  na  S11.576  Si 7.522 
backstop 
a.  Lambda is the shadow price, the present value of an additional barrel of oil. 
b.  hTV  is the net present value of producers' surplus or rent. 
e.  SW is social welfare, the present value of consumers' and producers' surplus. 
na = nor appiicable. 
Note: See Appendix for model structure and Table 4 for parameter values. Price Per Barrel 
SIO or less 
Sli  - 520 
TABLE  3 
General Economic Impact of Crude Oil Price Decision 
in Game Theory Frarneworli 
OECD Countries  Persian Gulf Oil 
Producers 
-higher GhT growth  -loss of OECD 
-shut domestic production  political support 
-greatly increased oil  -lower revenuel 
consumption  greater volume 
-much more imports  -higher market 
-more pollurion. climate  share 
change  -faster depietioii 
-end Persian Gulf politi- 
cal support 
-stable G?.?  growth 
-stable near-term oil 
production 
-slow-  growfh in oil 
consumption 
-slow growth in import 
share 
-stable prices 
-continued Persian Gulf 
support 
-decline in GZT' growth 
-r~pid  near-term sro\vth 
in production 
-stable or declining 
consumption 






-loss of OECD 
polirical support 
-less market share 
-less production, 
more profit, rent 
-greater payoff to 
successful lraq- 
type action TABLE 4 
Parametric .Assumptions 
Parameter  Numerical Value .Assumed 
P  i  8 
8,  1.3-!,0  per year 
8:  1.60%  per year 
4  1.619" per year 
ce,  S 10 per barrel (1989 pnces) 
h.*,  5 5 b~llion  (in 1990) 
4u  54000 (1  989 prices) 
S  2100 billion barrels (upper 596 probability of estimated resources) C OTHER A.R.M.E. WORKING PAPERS  -') 
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